揮別房麗美與房地美嗎? (2)

Farewell, Fannie and Freddie? 揮別房麗美與房地美嗎? (2)

Housing finance reform is off to a promising start 房屋財政改革正以有遠景的開始 

In an obvious bow to political reality, the bill’s authors don’t go that route. Instead, they offer a form of government intervention intended to bolster liquidity as Fannie and Freddie did — but with the risks to the public and private sectors better defined and shifted toward the latter. 

在對政治現實明顯的低頭，本法案提出人並未走那條路。相反地的，他們提供一種政府的干預形式，其目的是要支撑變現力，如房麗美與房地美過去做的相同，但對公私機構卻有風險，尤其它的定義是偏向私人機構。

Private investors would bundle home loans into securities and then pay a new Federal Mortgage Insurance Corp. to protect them against catastrophic losses. To qualify for the protection, securitizers would put up 10 cents of their own money for every dollar of risk. Government would cover losses only above that stake, drawing on the accumulated insurance fees. If that much skin in the game had been required under Fannie and Freddie, the bill’s authors say, there would have been no need for a bailout. As for affordable housing goals, those would be replaced by a dedicated fund, financed by a user fee for securitizers. 

私人投資者會把一些房貸束成擔保品，然後繳納費用給新的聯邦房貸保險公司，以保護不受大災難的損失。為符合被保護的資格，擔保者從他們自己的錢中提出一角作為每一元的風險。政府則從累積下來的保險費中，拿出來負擔超過那個風險的損失。法案提議者說，如果當時在房麗美與房地美之下，需要那一點皮毛的費用，那早就不需要保釋金了。至於負擔得起購房目標，那些就會用專用基金取代，此基金是從使用者付給擔保者的費用中提出的。 

 This would be more transparent than the old system. Instead of implicitly guaranteeing the liabilities of two entities — Fannie and Freddie — whose accounting practices, capitalization and management were relatively difficult to assess, the government would be openly guaranteeing assets — mortgages, ultimately — whose risks can be more readily measured. 

 這會比舊系統更透明化。政府會公開保證抵押品的資產，最後這些風險能更方便被評估，而非盲目地保證房麗美與房地美兩個團體，它們的會計習慣、投資和管理是相對難以估計。

The problem will be deciding how much government charges for this service and whether that fee is sufficient to account for risk and protect taxpayers. The proposal’s heavy capital requirements compensate, but over time the new corporation would come under heavy pressure to reduce its fees or relax its standards, or both, in the name of promoting homeownership or some other worthy cause. A system like the one Messrs. Warner and Corker propose could succeed only if it includes abundant checks and balances against that danger. For now it’s enough to say that their bill is a serious proposal for a serious issue. 

問題是決定對這種服務，政府的收費是多少，和那筆收費是否够負担風險與保護納稅人。此提案讓沈重的資金需要，補償了損失，但假以時日，新公司會在高壓之下遭遇到降低費用，或鬆懈出標準，或兩者都需要，因為美其名是，為促進房屋擁有權或其他高貴的目標。類似Warner and Corker兩位先生的提議，只有在它包含對危險，有充足的制衡條件之下，才能成功。我們此時只能這麼說，他們的法案是，針對一項嚴重問題的一種嚴重的提議。

Comment: 【譯者評論】：

不像在1988-1992年間，美國能巧妙地運用日本、德國、台灣與南韓等國的資金為它共同『買單』，受損失。從2007-09年美國的金融風暴與危機看，除了本身經濟面不理想外，在國際上找不到『替死鬼』來充砲灰。華爾街大亨們只有從美國的制度着手，反正『死道友，無死貧道』，因此在refinancing(二次房貸)中，兩大房貸公司被拖跨，全民買單，很難相信沒有『人謀不臧』? 猶記2007年美國西岸房價仍在飛飆時，東岸大户正積極脫手中或已脫手。事後這些賺取暴利的大公司沒有一個有刑責。這些大公司的負責人，有些還曾經是政府財政機構的高官，而政府高官出事了，就改當企業主管。有一項極有趣的巧合是，這此些公私立財經專家清一色是猶太裔(Jewish Americans) ，從前任的Greenspan(Federal Reserve-聯準會主席) 到柏南克到前幾任財長等。我們不禁要問：除猶太人外，無人懂得財經? Well, how do you like it? 


Washington Post Editorials 取材自華盛頓郵報社論 

譯者: Justin Lai, 

07/14/2013 

嘉中校友全聯會 

AACHW13