如果中國武力犯台，台灣如何自衛?-2

如果中國武力犯台，台灣如何自衛?-2

The Plan Taiwan Needs to Defend against China- by J. Michael Cole

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1946年台灣遭到228事件之浩劫時，美國一駐台官員(GeorgeKerr) 講了一句話，『台灣太小無法獨立，但台灣問題則大到不可忽視』(Taiwan is too small to be independent; the Taiwan’s issue is too big to be ignored.) 下列為外國記者客觀的、嚴峻的台海情勢。當大部分台灣人天天沈溺於舒適生活當中時，應該停下來思考這個問題，俗話說，『天有不測風雲』。另本文在網路上登在不起眼的國際新聞上，如果你關心台灣事務，希望引起你的注意：

《本文作者簡介》：

J. Michael Cole is a Taipei-based senior non-resident fellow with the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute and an associate researcher with the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC). He recently retired from the Thinking Taiwan Foundation and is a former analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). He has a master’s degree from the Royal Military College of Canada.

柯爾先生乃Nottingham(英國)大學中國政策學院，在台北的資深研究員，也是法國研究所專門研究中國問題的副研究員。最近自台灣智庫基金會退休，曾擔任加拿大安全情報中心分析師。他的學歷是加拿大皇家軍事學院碩士

                               J-20 stealth fighter-中共新隱形戰鬥機

Its current fixed SAM arsenal of ten U.S.-made Patriot batteries (forty launchers) and ten domestically produced Tien Kung “Sky Bow” III batteries (sixty launchers) are at the forefront of such efforts, with deployments near major urban centers and other key facilities in the north and south of Taiwan. According to analysts, one Patriot unit is capable of intercepting twenty-four targets at a time with a success rate of 90 percent. Those capabilities are augmented by fixed SAM PAC-2 and TK-I/IIs, as well as sea-based Standard Missile 2 (SM-2) air defense systems, with short-range systems deployed at various military bases as a final layer of defense.

   
                 SAM PAC-2                                                       SM-3

其當前固定式山姆軍火庫，儲藏有10個砲架的美制愛國者飛彈，（共四十個發射器）和十個國產"天弓"砲架（六十個發射器），這些全是防衛武力的前鋒武器；在主要城市市中心，和台灣北部和南部的主要設施中都有這些設備。依網站分析師，指出一個愛國者單位有能力攔截二十四個目標，一次成功率達 90%。這些能力增加了，因為有固定型山姆 PAC-2 和 TK/IIs，以及以海上為基地的標準型導彈 2 (SM-2) 防空系統，作為配備有短程系統的最後一層防禦，是將這些系統部署在各個不同的軍事基地中。

There is no doubt that China could attempt a “knockout punch” against Taiwan’s SAMs by overwhelming its air defense sites and using longer-range ballistic missiles than the SRBMs that the Patriot was designed to counter (e.g., DF-15, 16 and 21). However, such saturation attacks—between five and fifteen missiles per Patriot radar, for example—would constitute a major escalation on China’s part, as would a simultaneous or sequential air attack by the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), which would likely result in large amounts of collateral and international opprobrium. It should also be noted that the number of SRBMs needed to successfully overwhelm Taiwan’s air defense is contingent on the circular error probable (CEP) of the missiles involved. According to a recent report by the RAND Corporation, a total of forty-one ballistic missiles with a CEP of five meters would be needed to disable Taiwan’s air bases; that number would rise to 105 at a CEP of twenty-five meters and 155 at a CEP of forty meters. Besides the escalatory nature of such a massive missile strike, China has yet to demonstrate is ability to conduct simultaneous launches on such a scale.
   
                       SRBMs                                                            MRBMs

毫無疑問，中國可以徹底利用其防空設施，和使用比 SRBMs(它是愛國者飛彈要尅制的) ，更遠的彈道導彈(例如，DF-15，16，21) ，來克制台灣的SAMs飛彈，而予以重擊。然而，這種飽和攻擊，例如在每個愛國者飛彈雷達，介於五和十五個導彈，將構成中國攻擊的升高，將使中國人民解放軍空軍 (PLAAF) 同時或連續性的空中攻擊；這可能會導致大量的旁系和國際責難。此外應指出的是，SRBMs 能成功壓倒臺灣防空所需的數目是，取決於相關發射飛彈的圓概率誤差 (CEP)。根據蘭德公司最近的一份報告，需要總數四十一個彈道導彈，而CEP在五公尺，就能癱瘓臺灣的空軍基地; 但這一數位將升至 105顆飛彈， 二十五公尺的 CEP，和155顆飛彈， CEP 在四十公尺。除了這種大規模飛彈攻擊的升高性質以外，中國會同時發動類似此規模的攻擊來展現其實力。

     

          DF-15東風15飛彈                                                            DF-16東風15飛彈                                For the incoming administration, the best strategy will be to improve upon the redundancy and survivability of SAM radar and launcher sites on Taiwan proper and offshore (outlying islands), hardening targets, and building up non-ground-fixed SAM capability (e.g., sea-based SM-3), so as to force even greater escalation should China attempt to knock out Taiwan’s air defenses, C4ISR sites, government buildings and key infrastructure, as well as naval and air bases. The key isn’t to successfully defend against the entirety of the Second Artillery Corps’ 1,000–1,200 SRBMs, hundreds of MRBMs and PLA cruise missiles and PLAAF capabilities, but rather to close the door on the option of limited strikes with the assumption that the need for escalation creates its own deterrent.

對台灣新政府，最好的策略將是改善SAM 雷達的冗余，與其存活力，和臺灣本島及離島之發射器，強化目標，和山姆非固定在地面的能力 (例如，改由海對空發射的 SM-3)，以便迫使提高升級的對付能力，萬一中國嘗試重擊臺灣防空、 C4ISR 基地點、政府建築物與基礎設備，以及海、空軍基地。關鍵並不是成功抵禦全部的中國二炮兵部隊 1,000 —— 1,200 SRBMs，MRBMs 和中國人民解放軍的數百枚巡航導彈，毐中國人民解放軍空軍的作戰能力，而是要封鎖中國有限攻擊的選項，而這些攻擊，是在戰争升級的需要，創造出自己本身遏止能力的假設之下。

Closer intelligence cooperation with U.S. and Japanese assets in the region will also be crucial to increase situational awareness and preparedness. The United States could also contribute to Taiwan’s air defenses by agreeing to sell it Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, which were recently deployed in South Korea.

 與美國和日本在該地區的更密切的情報合作與評估，對增加情勢的知覺和防備也將是十分關鍵。美國同意出售『高空區域防禦能力系統(THAAD)』，也有助於臺灣的防空設施，這些系統最近在南韓部署。

   
                    高空防衛系统                                                 THAAD發射器

Sea Denial(海上防衛)...

未完

Justin Lai編譯

06/06/2016